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I. Introduction
The population of many lands is divided by factors such as origin, culture, religion
and race into two major groups: Hindus and Muslims in the Indian sub continent, Hutus
and Tutsis in Rwanda, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, Maronites and Muslims in Lebanon,
Jews and Palestinians in Israel-Palestine, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland,
Muslims and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina, Pushtuns and Tadzhiks in
Afghanistan, Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, Indians and Melanesians in Fiji, and
Blacks and Whites in South Africa, to mention a few. Conflicts between the two groups
inhabiting these lands seem to be imminent and constitute a major aspect of their
coexistence.
The recent economic literature on conflicts deals with three major issues: the
foundations of conflicts, external conflicts and internal conflicts. The literature on the
foundations of conflicts views conflicts as emerging from a state of nature where property
rights are not well defined. In the absence of complete assignment of enforceable property
rights no agent can be prevented from coercing another agent, and seizing and defending
resources. Hirschleifer (1995) calls this state anarchy and shows that its spontaneous order
is fragile and is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting
effort and incomes exceed the viability minimum. Cooperation is a possible outcome even
when property rights do not exist. Skaperdas (1992) shows that there is a possibility of
cooperation when win probabilities are significantly different only for large arms
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differentials and when their marginal contributions to useful production are similar.
Grossman and Kim (1995) analyze a general equilibrium model of resource allocation to
appropriation and productive activities. They focus attention on a non-aggressive
equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons, defined as predatory
instruments, and claims to property are fully secure.
The literature on external conflicts stresses political and economic factors that may
influence wars. For instance, Grafinkel (1994) studies the interactions between domestic
politics and international conflicts and shows that political party competition associated
with electoral uncertainty leads to a decline in military spending. She argues that
democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible “pre-commitment” mechanism that
reduces the severity of conflict between nations. Hess and Orphaniedes (2001), however,
dispute the idea that democracy and democratic institutions reduce conflict and war
frequency among nations. Bearce and Fisher (2002) argue that given geographical
parameters, there is an inverse relationship between trade and war. (See also Dorussen,
2002.) Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) show how other economic factors such as income
inequality and pervasive rent-seeking by a ruling elite are linked to war and state violence.
Hess and Orphanides (1995) stress the role of recessions as triggering foreign conflict.
Blomberg and Hess (2002) argue that a recession combined with external conflict
increases the probability of internal conflict.
In the context of internal conflicts, which is the focus of our paper, the utmost
interest is given by the literature to civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that civil
wars happen if rebels’ perceptions of benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. Civil wars
are motivated either by “greed” for private gains or by “grievance” stemming from the
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degree of autocracy of the regime and ethnic and religious differences. (Cf., Collier and
Hoeffler, 2000). Evidence provided by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) show that civil wars in
Africa are mainly due to poor economic performance. In addition to political-economic
factors, the roles of ideology, ethnicity and religion in civil wars are emphasized. Elbadawi
and Sambanis (2002) find that democracy is negatively associated with civil violence and
that civil-war prevalence is positively associated with ethnic fractionalization. Gershenson
and Grossman (2000) argued that for civil conflict to be never ending the ratio values
attached to political dominance can be neither too large nor too small. Reynal-Querol
(2002) concludes that religious differences are a social cleavage more important than
linguistic differences in the development of a civil war and that democracy significantly
reduces the incidence of ethnic civil war. Agadjanian and Prata (2002) discuss the effects
of civil wars on population. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) examine the effect of civil wars
on growth and on human and physical capital.

Civil war is one possible outcome of internal conflicts in dual-population countries.
Partition of the land between the rival groups and, alternatively, a formation of a
federation are possible outcomes representing two polar approaches for settling conflicts
peacefully. Each of these three possible outcomes of conflicts evolves from a combination
of socioeconomic characteristics of the rival groups. Table 1 below focuses on a few,
major, characteristics: human and material capital disparities, cultural and spiritual
differences and degree of group cohesion. For exposition purpose, these characteristics
are aggregated into two composite ones. The entries of the table indicate the likely
political equilibrium in dual-population lands for various levels of differences between the
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two rival groups with regard to these composite characteristics. The rationale underlying
these political equilibrium outcomes is based on the premises that:
i. when the cultural differences are large (small) and the degree of cohesion of each
of the groups is high (low) the costs of tolerating a peaceful coexistence are high (low) for
each group; and
ii. when the human and material capital disparities are large the costs of civil war
for the richer (poorer) group are low (high), whereas when both groups are equally
endowed with material wealth and population, the costs of civil war for each group are
high.
Table 1. Possible equilibria for various combinations of socioeconomic differences
between the two inhabiting groups

1. Small
human and material
capital disparities

2. Medium
human and
material capital
disparities
3. Large
human and material
capital disparities

1. Small
cultural&spiritual
differences
and low group
cohesion

2. Medium
cultural&spiritual
differences
and medium group
cohesion

Integration
or
Federation
(stable)

Federation
(unstable)
or
Partition

Federation
(stable/unstable)

Partition
or
Civil War

Partition
or
Civil War

Federation
(unstable)

Federation
(unstable)

Civil War

3. Large
cultural&spiritual
differences
and high group
cohesion

Partition
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The term civil war is used in Table 1 and the paper as a generic title representing
any coercive interaction between the two groups, including a large scale war (a likely
event in case 2-3 and to a lesser extent in case 2-2), guerrilla warfare, ethnic cleansing,
and submission of one group to its rival (likely outcomes in case 3-3). Similarly, a
federation can be stable or unstable. When the cultural and spiritual differences between
the groups are small and the degree of cohesion of each group is low and the level of
human and material disparity between the groups is low, the probability of a stable
federation, or even integration, is high (case 1-1). When the groups are considerably
cohesive and the cultural and spiritual differences between them are substantial, or when
the human and material capital disparities between the groups are large, a federation is
likely to be unstable (cases 1-2, 3-1 and 3-2). Partition is likely to be a stable equilibrium
when the cultural and spiritual differences between the groups are large and each group is
highly cohesive (cases 1-3 and 2-3).
There may also be external factors affecting the interaction between the two rival
groups and, subsequently, their political equilibrium. Although our analysis is focused on
internal factors, the effect of external factors is indirectly incorporated through the groups’
perceptions and consideration of their differences. On the one hand, external factors such
as close relationship with the motherlands might polarize a local population by
strengthening ethnic identity. 1 On the other hand, external factors such as a threat of
invading peoples may moderate groups’ perception of the magnitude and importance of
their socioeconomic differences and increase their degrees of mutual tolerance and
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As in the case of Greeks and Turks in contemporary Cyprus.
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solidarity. 2 Facing a common enemy, rival groups may form a federation and encourage
integration. Left alone, they might prefer partition, or fight one another.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the economic growth theory to the case of
dual-population lands in the aforementioned political situations: partition, federation and
civil war. The analysis concentrates on the role of two important demographic and
economic factors such as population growth rate and wealth disparities and compare the
optimal consumption growth rates across the possible political outcomes. This comparison
identifies the conditions that may generate political instability and transition from one
political state of affair to another under the assumption that the members of each group
are lifetime-utility maximizers.
Our presentation of the possible political situations in dual-population lands and
their implications for growth starts in section II with a partition scenario because the
analysis of this case can serve as benchmark for the analytically more complicated cases of
federation and civil war. Section III analyzes the federation outcome and its implication
for growth and convergence when the federation is strictly political and, alternatively,
when the federation provides economic benefits through technological exchange and also
when the federation facilitates a flow of capital and labor between the two groups. Section
IV analyzes the civil-war outcome and its implication for growth and convergence with a
distinction between casualty-intensive (bloody) warfare and capital-destruction-intensive
(sabotage) warfare. Section V concludes.
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As in the cases of the Athenians and Spartans in ancient Greece, the tribes of Israel and,
subsequently, the kingdoms of Judah and Israel in the biblical period.
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II. Partition
Our presentation of this case is based on the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (demographics): The land is inhabited by two groups ( i = 1,2 ). The groups
are highly cohesive (i.e., the number of intermarriages is negligible) and the size of each
group is given by an exponential growth function
Pi (t ) = Pi 0 e ni t

(1)

where Pi 0 and ni are the initial size and the population growth rate of the i-th group,
respectively.
Assumption 2 (intolerance and deterrence): There are considerable cultural and spiritual
differences between the groups, and at least one of the groups prefers a split to
coexistence under a single political-economic system. None of the groups is relatively very
poor in human and material capital and can be easily subjected by the other.
Assumption 3 (utility): The groups are homogenous with regard to preferences. The
instantaneous utility from consumption ( c ) of a member of group i is given by ui (ci (t )) ,
with ui ' > 0 and ui "< 0 . For tractability, the explicit form
ui = ci βi , 0 < βi < 1 ,

(2)

is considered. The member’s lifetime utility is additively separable in the instantaneous
utilities and displays a non-negative invariant rate of time preference ρi .
Assumption 4 (production and income): The groups are homogenous with regard to
production. Under separation, the aggregate output of each group is given by a CobbDouglas production function homogenous of degree 1 in labor and capital and satisfying
Inada’s conditions. Consequently, the income of a member of each group is a concave
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function of the capital-labor ratio in the respective group, i.e., f i ( ki (t )) with f i ' > 0 and
fi " < 0 .
Assumption 5 (capital accumulation): Capital is linearly depreciated, which, in
conjunction with assumptions 1 and 4, implies that, under separation, the instantaneous
change in the capital of member of each group i = 1,2 is given by
•

k i (t ) = f i (k i (t )) − c i (t ) − (δ i + ni )k i (t )

(3)

where δi is the capital depreciation rate in group i .
In view of assumptions 1 and 2, the costs of civil war are high, but also the costs
of tolerating coexistence in a federation are high. Hence, the political Nash equilibrium is
division of the land into two sovereign states or autonomous parts. 3 Under partition, each
group’s optimal (lifetime-utility maximizing) consumption change follows the well known,
Ramsey-type, no-arbitrage rule:

•

c i (t ) f i ' (k i (t )) − ( ρ i + δ i + ni )
cˆ ≡
=
ci (t )
1 − βi

(4)

which states that the instantaneous rate of change in the optimal consumption for each
group is equal to the difference between the marginal product and user cost of capital,
deflated by the degree of concavity (one minus the elasticity) of the instantaneous utility
function of the members.

3

Notable examples are the partitions of the Indian sub-continent in 1947/8, Palestine in
1947/8, and Cyprus in the early 1970s.
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III. Federation
Three types of federations are considered. The first is a strictly political federation.
The second allows a limited economic cooperation - technological transfer between the
two groups comprising the federation. The third also allows flow of capital and labor and
intermarriages, which may transform the dual-population society into an integrated one.
III.1 Federation without Economic Cooperation
Assumption 6 (strictly political federation): The two groups are united into a political
federation. However, each group retains its own identity and economic interests: there is
no (significant) mobility of population and capital and there is no (significant) transfer of
technology.
Assumption 7 (continuation and dissolution): There is no upper-bound on the federation
life expectancy. However, the federation might be dissolved at every instance t with some
probability φ( t ) , whose cumulative distribution function is F (t ) . The probability of
continuation (survival) of the federation beyond t (i.e., Φ( t ) = 1 − F ( t ) ) diminishes with
the wealth disparity between the two groups as displayed by
Φ( t ) = e − µ[ k1 (t ) − k 2 ( t )]

2

(5)

where µ is a positive scalar indicating the sensitivity of the federation’s existence to
wealth disparity between the groups. The underlying rationale is that wealth differential
intensifies relative deprivation, social tension and, subsequently, political instability – the
larger the groups’ wealth differential the greater the discontent of the poorer one with the
federal system.
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Assumption 8 (federal social welfare): The instantaneous federal social welfare (FSW)
level is given by the sum of the instantaneous utilities of the individuals affiliated to the
federation. Recalling assumptions 4 and 5 that the members of each group are identical,

FSW (t ) = P1 (t )u1 (c1 (t )) + P2 (t )u2 (c2 (t )) .

(6)

Assumption 9 (imaginary crossbreed): The representative agent of the federation is an
imaginary crossbreed of the two groups. His instantaneous well being, u(t ) , reflects an
equal share in the federation’s instantaneous social welfare level and hence is found by
dividing the instantaneous federal social welfare by the federation’s population

u( t ) =

FSW (t )
.
P1 ( t ) + P2 ( t )

(7)

By substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (7), the instantaneous well being of the federal
representative, imaginary crossbreed is equal to the weighted average of the groups’
representatives’ instantaneous utilities




P1 (t )
P2 (t )
u( t ) = 
 u1 ( c1 ( t )) + 
 u (c ( t )) .
 P1 ( t ) + P2 (t ) 
 P1 (t ) + P2 ( t )  2 2

(8)

Assumption 10 (expected lifetime utility): The federal representative imaginary crossbreed
is aware of the fragility of the federation and the possibility of its dissolution. He has
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constant, non-negative, rate of time preference ( ρ ≥ 0 ). He chooses the consumption
trajectories of his composite personality so as to maximize his expected-lifetime utility
∞

t

0

0

J = ∫ φ ( t ) ∫ e − ρτ u(τ )dτdt .

(9)

To solve the federal representative imaginary crossbreed’s problem note that, as
explained

in

Appendix

A,

∞

t

∞

0

0

0

J = ∫ φ (t ) ∫ e − ρτ u(τ ) dτdt = ∫ e − ρt u( t ) Φ( t ) dt ,

recall

assumption 5 and express the consumption of each group as
•

ci (t ) = f i ( k i (t )) − (δ i + ni )k i (t ) − k i (t ) .

(10)

By substituting this expression (Eq. (10)) into the imaginary crossbreed’s instantaneous
utility function and applying Euler equation, the optimal consumption growth rate of each
group i affiliated to the federation is given, as explained in a greater detail in Appendix B,
by the following no-arbitrage rule
2µ
[k i (t ) − k j (t )]ci (t )
c i (t ) f i ' (k i (t )) − ( ρ + δ i + ni ) (n j − ni ) p j (t ) β i
cˆ F ≡
=
−
−
ci (t )
1− βi
1 − βi
1 − βi
•

(11)

where j denotes the counterpart group whose population share in the federation is
p j (t ) = Pj (t ) / [ P1 ( t ) + P2 ( t )] .

(12)

For each of the groups, the first term on the right-hand side of this strictly political
federation’s no-arbitrage rule is identical to the no-arbitrage rule in partition, but with the
groups’ average rate of time preference replacing that of the individual group.
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The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) indicates that the effect of the
j-th group’s share in the federation’s population on the optimal rate of change of
consumption of the i-th group is negative (positive), and hence providing an incentive for
the i-th group to withdraw from (remain in) the federation, if the j-th group’s rate of
population growth is larger (smaller) than that of the i-th group. When the populations of
both groups grow at the same rate, the effect of the j-th population share on the i-th
group’s consumption growth rate is nil.
The third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) reveals that the wealth disparity
between the members of group i and the members of group j adversely affects the
federation’s stability and prospect of survival and moderates the optimal consumption
growth rate of the i-th group members.
Thus, starting from the same initial capital-labor ratio and with a rate of time
preference not considerably larger than that of the imaginary crossbreed, the optimal rate
of change in the consumption of group i members in a strictly political federation ( ĉ F ) is
lower than their optimal consumption growth rate under sole sovereignty ( ĉ ) in the case
of partition if their population growth rate is lower than that of their j-th group
counterparts and if they are wealthier than their j-th group counterparts. In sum, group i
prefers to secede from a political federation characterized by no economic cooperation if
its rate of time preference is not considerably larger than that of the imaginary crossbreed
so that:
{( n j > ni ) and ( ki (t ) > k j ( t )} ⇒ {c$ F < c$} .

(13)
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III.2 Federation with Partial Economic Cooperation
Let us now relax a part of assumption 6 and allow exchange of technology
between the two groups comprising the federation. Movement of labor and capital remains
prohibited.
Assumption 11 (cost-free and perfect technological transfer): Capital does not become
obsolete by technological transfer and adjustment costs are negligible. The two groups
perfectly and immediately exchange technological knowledge.
This assumption and (the earlier assumed) rational behavior imply that the two groups use
the same hybrid technology, f , since f ( k i ( t )) ≥ f i ( ki (t )) for each group i = 1,2 at
every instance.
In this case of partial economic cooperation, the optimal consumption growth rate
of each group i affiliated to the federation is given by the following no-arbitrage rule

2µ
[k i (t ) − k j (t )]ci (t )
c i (t ) f ' (k i (t )) − ( ρ + δ i + ni ) (n j − ni ) p j (t ) β i
cˆC ≡
=
−
−
.
ci (t )
1− βi
1 − βi
1 − βi
•

(14)

In contrast to the strictly political federation case, the members of group i may
economically benefit from joining the federation, even when they are wealthier and
multiply in a lower rate than their counterparts, if they significantly gain from
technological transfer; namely, if
f ' ( k i (t )) − f i ' ( k i (t )) + ( ρ i − ρ ) > (n j − ni ) p j (t ) +

2µ
[k i (t ) − k j (t )]ci (t )
βi

then cˆ c > cˆ > cˆ F for any ki and t .
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III.3 Federation with Broad Economic Cooperation and Integration
The case of a broader economic cooperation and integration requires a further
relaxation of assumption 6 to allow capital and labor flows and a relaxation of assumption
1 to allow intermarriages. Significant, continuous flow of capital and labor and
intermarriages can be interpreted as a process of integration of the two groups. As
indicated by Table 1, integration may take place when the cultural, spiritual and human
and material wealth differences between the groups are small and when each group is not
highly cohesive (in which case, µ → 0 ). When integration starts the crossbreed is no
longer imaginary. When integration is completed, the crossbreed is dominant. The optimal
consumption growth rate of the society of crossbreeds is given by the Ramsey-type no
arbitrage rule -- the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) but with time-preference
rate, population-growth rate, depreciation rate and technology characterizing the society
of crossbreeds.

IV. Civil-War
In civil war, each group makes offenses against the other. Group i takes into
account that its own effort in carrying hostile activities ( hi ) increases its satisfaction, but
adversely affects its capital accumulation due to divergence of resources from production
to warfare activity. In the same vein, the effort of the antagonist group ( h j ) inflicts
casualties on group i (i.e., reduces the population growth of group i), and damages its
current capital stock (i.e., accelerates the depreciation rate of the capital stock of group i).
These aspects of civil-war are more formally presented by the following assumptions.
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Assumption 12 (war-time utility): In addition to, and separately from, satisfaction from
consumption, each group generates instantaneous utility from carrying hostile activities
against its adversary. That is,

ui (t ) = ui (ci (t ), hi (t ))

(15)

∂ui
∂ui
∂ 2 ui
∂ 2 ui
∂ 2 ui
∂ 2 ui
=0=
.
where
> 0,
< 0,
> 0,
< 0,
∂ci
∂hi
∂hi ∂ci
∂ci hci
∂hi 2
∂ci 2

Assumption 13 (war-time capital accumulation): The war effort reduces the i-th group’s
capital-investment possibilities. In addition, the hostile actions carried by its adversary
adversely affect the i-th group’s population growth and capital stock. More specifically,
•

k i (t ) = f i (k i (t )) − ci (t ) − hi (t ) − [δ i (h j (t )) + ni ( h j (t ))]k i (t )

where,

(16)

∂δi
∂ 2δi
∂ni
∂ 2 ni
> 0,
<
0
,
<
0
,
< 0.
∂h j
∂h j
∂h j 2
∂h j 2

In this differential game we assume open-loop strategies. The Hamiltonian
corresponding to each group i problem of choosing its consumption and hostility
trajectories can be expressed as:
H i (t ) = e − ρ it u i (ci (t ), hi (t )) + λi (t ){ f i (k i (t )) − ci (t ) − hi (t ) − [δ i ( h j (t )) + ni (h j (t ))]k i (t )}
+ λ j (t ){ f j ( k j (t )) − c j (t ) − h j (t ) − [δ j ( hi (t )) + n j ( hi (t ))]k j (t )}

(17)

and the first-order conditions are
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.

λ i (t ) = −λi (t ){ f i ' ( k i (t )) − [δ i ( h j (t )) + ni (h j (t ))]}
e − ρ i t u i ' (c i (t )) − λ i (t ) = 0

 ∂δ j ∂n j 
e − ρit u i ' (hi (t )) − λi (t ) − λ j (t ) 
+
 k j (t ) = 0 .
 ∂hi ∂hi 

(18)
(19)

(20)

Consistently with assumption 12, let
ui = ci

βi

+ hi

γi

(21)

then the optimal consumption growth rate of each group i in civil war is given by
•

c i (t ) f i ' ( k i (t )) − ( ρ i + δ i ( h j ) + ni ( h j ))
cˆW ≡
=
.
ci (t )
1 − βi

(22)

Comparing the civil-war no-arbitrage rule of consumption to the partition noarbitrage rule of consumption, it is interesting to note that when the hostile actions taken
by group j are mainly and effectively directed to inflict casualties upon group i than to
damage its capital stock, the civil-war rate of growth of the i-th group’s consumption is
larger than the partition rate of growth of its consumption and, consequently, also exceeds
its rate of consumption growth in a strictly political federation. That is, c$w > c$ > c$ F for
the group (i) on the receiving hand. The underlying rationale is as follows.
Recalling assumption 13, when the actions of group j are mainly directed to inflict
casualties and are effective, the capital-labor ratio’s depreciation rate for group i during
the civil-war (δi (h j ) + ni (h j ) ) and, consequently, its user-cost of (per capita) capital are
smaller than those under partition. Moreover, starting from the same initial capital-labor
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ratio and consumption level, per-capita capital accumulation in civil war by group i is
smaller than that under partition due to diversion of resources to military activities and
destruction inflicted by group j’s operations. Recalling that the production function is
concave, group i’s marginal product of capital in the civil war is larger than that under
partition. In sum, group i’s marginal-product and user-cost differential in a casualtyintensive warfare launched by group j is larger than that under partition and, in view of
equations (4) and (22), facilitating a higher consumption growth rate for group i.4
The above argument suggests that, when both groups are sufficiently large, each
group “prefers” (from the perspective of consumption-maximizing-lifetime utility) a
casualty-intensive (bloody) warfare by its adversary to a capital-damaging (sabotage)
warfare. In contrast, in a sabotage-intensive warfare both the user costs and marginal
product of per capita capital for the recipient group are larger than those under partition
and strictly political federation. If the excess user cost (vis-a-vis partition and federation)
is larger (smaller) than the excess marginal product of per-capita capital, the rate of
growth of the recipient group’s consumption during a sabotage-intensive campaign of its
adversary is smaller (larger) than those under partition and federation. From the
perspective of lifetime-utility-maximizing consumption, sabotage is, therefore, a more
effectively harming course of action (in particular, for the smaller and poorer group) than
bloody warfare.
Attention should also be paid to the evolution of the level of hostility. In this openloop differential game the growth rate of hostility displayed by group i is:
4

This analytically derived result is consistent with the folk saying: “Let us eat and drink;
for to morrow we shall die”. (Bible, Isaiah 22:13)
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•

[

h i (t )
= γ i (γ i −1) − (δ j ' ' ( hi ) + n j ' ' ( hi )) λ j k j
hi (t )

]

−1

•
•
•


βi − 2
β
β
c
c
(
−
1
)
i + (δ j ' ( hi ) + n j ' ( hi ) ) [ λ j k j + λ j k j ]
i
i
i


.(23)

(See Appendix C.)
As the sum in the brackets in the first term on the right-hand side of this expression is
negative, group i’s rate of growth of hostility towards group j increases with the evolution
of group’s j wealth. That is, group i becomes more aggressive as group j’s capital stock
grows along time.

V. Conclusion
When the costs of civil war are affected by human and material wealth disparities
between the two groups inhabiting the land and when the costs of tolerating coexistence
rise with the groups’ cultural and spiritual differences and degree of cohesion, the
equilibrium political state of affair is either partition, federation, or civil war, pending the
particular combination of the groups’ socioeconomic characteristics. The optimal
consumption trajectories associated with these possible equilibrium political systems were
compared. If the members of each group are lifetime-utility maximizers, this comparison
identifies the conditions that may generate political instability and transition from one
political state of affair to another.
Starting from the same initial capital-labor ratio, the optimal consumption growth
rate for group i in a strictly political federation is lower than its optimal consumption
growth rate under sole sovereignty in the case of partition if its population growth rate is
lower than that of group j and if it is wealthier than group j. In contrast, the members of
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group i may economically benefit from joining a federation, even when they are wealthier
and multiply in a lower rate than their counterparts in group j, if the federation facilitates
technological transfer and if their initial technology is inferior to the hybrid.
Our analysis suggests that the growth rate of a group’s consumption during a civil
war is larger than those attainable under partition and a strictly political federation if its
adversary’s warfare is mainly aimed at inflicting casualties. In a civil war, each group may
prefer (from the perspective of consumption-maximizing-lifetime utility) a casualtyintensive warfare by its adversary to sabotage. The rate of growth of the recipient group’s
consumption during a sabotage-intensive campaign of its adversary is smaller (larger) than
those under partition and federation if the extra user cost is larger (smaller) than the extra
marginal product of per capita capital. From the perspective of consumption-maximizinglifetime utility, sabotage is a more effective strategy than casualty-inflicting operations.

19

References
Agadjanian, V. and N. Prata (2002) War, peace, and fertility in Angola, Demography 39,
215-231.
Bearce, D.H. and E. Fisher (2002) Economic geography, trade and war, Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46, 365-393.
Blomberg, B. S. and G.D. Hess (2002) The temporal links between conflict and economic
activity, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 74-90.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998) On economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic
Papers 50, 563-573.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2000) Greed and grievance in civil war, Centre for the Study
of African Economies Working Paper: WPS/00/18 2000.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2002) On the incidence of civil war in Africa, Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46, 13-28.
Dorussen, H. (2002) Trade and conflict in multi-country models: A rejoinder, Journal of
Peace Research 39, 115-118.
Elbadawi, I. And N. Sambanis (2002) How much war will we see ? Explaining the
prevalence of civil war, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 307-334.
Garfinkel, M.R. (1994) Domestic politics and international conflict, American Economic
Review 84, 1294-1309.
Grossman, H.I. and M. Kim (1995) Swords or plowshares ? A theory of the security of
claims to property, Journal of Political Economy 103, 1275-1288.
Hess, G.D. and A. Orphanides (1995) War politics: An economic, rational-voter
framework, American Economic Review 85, 828-846.

20

Hess, G.D. and A. Orphanides (2001) War and democracy, Journal of Political Economy
109, 776-810.
Hirshleifer, J. (1995) Anarchy and its breakdown, Journal of Political Economy 103, 2652.
Murdoch, J.C. and T. Sandler (2002) Economic growth, civil wars, and spatial spillovers,
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 91-110.
Nafziger, E.W. and J. Auvinen (2002) Economic development, inequality, war and state
violence, World Development 30, 153-163.
Reynal-Querol, M. (2002) Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars, Journal of Conflict
Resolution 46, 29-54.
Skaperdas, S. (1992) Cooperation, conflict, and power in the absence of property rights,
American Economic Review 82, 720-739.

21

APPENDICES
Appendix A: The Crossbreed’s lifetime expected utility
∞

t

∞

0

0

0

Claim: J = ∫ φ (t ) ∫ e − ρτ u(τ )dτdt = ∫ e − ρt u( t ) Φ( t ) dt .
Proof: Let F (t ) is the cumulative density function associated with the probability of
dissolution at t (i.e., the probability of continuation up to t ), then
φ(t ) = F ' (t )

(A1)

and Eq. (9) can be rendered as
∞
∞
t

J = ∫ F ' (t )  ∫ e − ρτ u(τ ) dτ dt = ∫ v (t )dU
0

0
0

(A2)

where,

t

v = ∫ e − ρτ u(τ ) dτ

(A3)

0

and
U = − (1 − F (t )) .

(A4)

The integration by parts rule suggests that
∞

∞

0

0

J = ∫ vdU = Uv − ∫ Udv .

(A5)

Note, however, that
∞

t


Uv = − (1 − F (t )) ∫ e − ρτ u(τ ) dτ  = 0

0
0

(A6)

because when evaluated at the lower limit
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0


Uv = − (1 − F ( 0)) ∫ e − ρτ u(τ ) dτ  = 0
0



(A7)

and when evaluated at the upper limit
∞


Uv = − (1 − F ( T )) ∫ e − ρτ u(τ ) dτ  = 0

0


(A8)

as
lim F = 1 .

t→∞

(A9)

Hence,
∞

J = − ∫ Udv .

(A10)

0

By virtue of equation (A3)
dv = e −ρτ dτ

(A11)

and the substitution of equations (A4) and (A11) into (A10) implies
∞

J = ∫ e − ρt u( t )Φ(t )dt

(A12)

0

where

Φ(t ) ≡ −u(t ) = 1 − F (t )

(A.13)

and indicating the probability of the survival of the federation at least until t . QED
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Appendix B: The Crossbreed’s optimal consumption growth rate
Following Appendix A and substituting Eq. (10) for ci , the imaginary crossbreed’s
lifetime utility is
∞

J = ∫e
0





f i ( ki (t )) − (δi + ni ) ki (t ) − k i ( t )) Φ( k1 (t ), k 2 (t ))dt .
 ∑ pi (t ) ui ( 1
44444
4
2
44444
4
3
i = 1

ci ( t )



− ρt 

2

.

(B1)



∂J
d  ∂J 
By virtue of Euler equation,
−
= 0 , the necessary condition for maximum
∂ki dt  . 
 ∂ ki 
lifetime utility is

(

)

d − ρt
e − ρt pi ui '( ci )[ f i ' ( ki ) − (δi + ni )]Φ + e − ρt pi ui (ci ) Φ k i +
e
pi ui '( ci ) Φ = 0 (B2)
dt
which implies
.

.

.

pi ui ' (ci )[ f i ' ( ki ) − ( ρ + δi + ni )]Φ + pi ui (ci ) Φ k i + p i ui ' (ci ) Φ + pi ui "(ci )Φ ci + pi ui '( ci ) Φ = 0
.(B3)
.

Divide both sides of Eq. (B3) by pi ui 'Φ and solve for ci to obtain
. 
 ui   Φ k i   p i 
 + 
[ f i ' ( ki ) − ( ρ + δi + ni )] +   
 ui '   Φ   pi 
.
 
ci =
.
− ui "( ci ) / ui '( ci )

(B4)

Note that by virtue of Eq. (2)
ui
= ci / βi
ui '

(B5)

and
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u"
− i = (1 − βi ) / βi ci .
ui '

(B6)

Note further that by virtue of Eq. (5)
Φ ki
Φ

= −2µ( ki − k j ) .

(B7)

By definition

.

pi
pi

≡

d  Pi 


dt  Pi + Pj 
Pi
Pi + Pj

(B8)

and recall Eq. (1)
.

pi
pi

= ( ni − n j ) p j .

(B9)

Eq. (11) is obtained by substituting Eq. (B5) - Eq. (B9) into Eq. (B4) and dividing both
sides by ci .
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Appendix C: The optimal rate of change of hostility
By differentiating
 ∂δ j ∂n j 
e − ρi t u i ' (hi (t )) − λi (t ) − λ j (t ) 
+
 k j (t ) = 0
 ∂hi ∂hi 

(C1)

with respect to time:
•
•
 ∂δ j ∂ n j 

 •
+
e − ρit ui ''(hi (t )) hi (t ) − ρi ui '(hi (t ))  − λ i (t ) − λ j (t ) 
 k j (t )
∂
∂
h
h


i 
 i
•
 ∂ 2δ j ∂ 2 n j 
 ∂δ j ∂ n j 
(
)
(
)
(
)
− k j (t ) 
+
λ
t
−
λ
t
+
k
t
h
i (t ) = 0

j
 j
2
2  j
∂
h
∂
h
∂
h
∂
h
 i
i 
i 
 i
•

(C2)
and by rearranging terms, equation (23) is obtained.
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